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Abstract
The United States Forest Service is governed by a strict legal framework
determining when and how it can charge recreation fees. Current law precludes the
Forest Service from charging entrance or parking fees. A system of recreation passes
provides public access to all federal lands. Yet, when traveling to thousands of national
forest campgrounds and trailheads, visitors must pay an entrance and parking fee,
even if they have a federal recreation pass. Delegating authority from the agency to
concessionaires—third party land managers—creates a situation in which federal passes
do not grant access to the lands they cover. The rise of concessionaires led to concerns
over recreation fees touching issues integral to public lands themselves. Additionally,
the Forest Service itself circumvents statutes requiring the presence of certain amenities
in order to charge recreation fees. These workarounds are the subject of recent and
ongoing legal challenges. These activities frustrate the public’s trust in land management
agencies and leads to instability and confusion for recreational visitors. The legal
framework should be modified to create a level playing field for recreation fees, and
the concession system itself should be reexamined with an eye towards removing profitmotivated third parties from public land operation.
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I. Introduction
Deschutes National Forest in Oregon has no campgrounds operated by the
United States Forest Service. There are plenty of campgrounds; more than eighty,
in fact. But these campgrounds are managed and operated by private entities.1
Privately operated recreation facilities are not limited to Deschutes. Today, private
entities manage more than 2,000 national forest recreation sites.2 Drive, hike,
ride, or bike into a national forest campground and you are more likely to see an
employee of private third parties accepting fees than a Forest Service employee.
The extensive presence of third parties operating recreation facilities on
federal lands raises a twinge of discomfort in many recreation users, evincing a
sense that something is not quite right. This sense is amplified when recreation
users arriving at campgrounds and trailheads find a private company employee
asking for entrance and access fees. The Forest Service’s stated mission3 and those
of third party operators managing recreation sites in the national forests may
not stem from the same values and goals. National forests are one of our most
precious resources. Is anything lost by entrusting the care and operation of these
sites to profit-motivated third parties? If not, do we lose anything essential when
third parties become the face of the Forest Service to millions of recreational users
enjoying the national forests each year?
This dilemma stems from the regulatory structures governing the agency’s
ability to administer fees. The Forest Service’s statutory framework for
1
See Terry Richard, Deschutes Forest Adds Reservable Campgrounds, The Oregonian (Nov.
16, 2009, 12:55 PM), http://blog.oregonlive.com/terryrichard/2009/03/deschutes_forest_adds_
reservab.html.
2

See Coggins, George et al., Federal Public Land and Resources Law 961 (2007).

“The mission of the USDA Forest Service is to sustain the health, diversity, and productivity
of the Nation’s forests and grasslands to meet the needs of present and future generations.” Privacy
Act of 1974; New System of Records, 77 Fed. Reg. 24,929, 24,930 (Apr. 26, 2012). A list of vision
statements and guiding principles can be found at http://www.fs.fed.us/about us/mission.html (last
visited Aug. 17, 2013).
3
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administering recreation fees prohibits charging national forest visitors an
entrance fee.4 Additionally, the Forest Service cannot charge a fee for parking at
or hiking from a trailhead. Forest Service policy, however, does not require third
party operators—concessionaires—to honor certain recreation passes which allow
passholders access to all Forest Service lands without paying additional access
fees.5 And yet, travelling to Brainard Lake National Recreation Area in Roosevelt
National Forest in Colorado, requires an entrance fee—whether you are using
the facilities or just leaving your car to hike into the surrounding wilderness area.
A framework in which concessionaires are allowed to charge entrance fees while
the agency itself would not be allowed to do so is made possible by a unique
regulatory loophole for third parties.6
This article examines the unique relationship between the Forest Service and
concessionaires. It begins with a discussion of the Forest Service’s history, with a
specific eye towards the rise of recreation and concessionaires.7 It then examines
the Federal Lands Recreation Enhancement Act (FLREA) and the methods by
which the agency bends the requirements embodied therein.8 Finally, this article
discusses the foundational concerns with giving concessionaires control over
such a valuable public asset and resources, and proposes a new framework for
recreation management.9

II. History
The United States government began setting aside land as “forest reserves”
from public domain lands in 1891 with the passage of the Forest Reserve Act.10
The Reserve Act tasked the Department of the Interior with administering these
forest reserves.11 Soon after, Congress passed the 1897 Sundry Civil Appropriations
Act, commonly known as the Organic Act of 1897 (Organic Act).12 The Organic
Act created the Division of Geography and Forestry—later known as the Forest
Service—within the United States Geological Survey in the Department of
Agriculture.13 The Organic Act provided a kind of mission statement guiding
the new agency and established binding Presidential authority to create forest
Federal Lands Recreation Enhancement Act (FLREA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6814 (2013).
The FLREA applies to federal recreational lands and waters administered by the Forest Service, the
Bureau of Land Management (BLM), and the Bureau of Reclamation. Id. § 6801(d)(1).
4

5

See 16 U.S.C. § 6813(d) (2014).

6

See infra Part IV.

7

See infra Part II.

8

See infra Part IV.

9

See infra Part IX.

10

Coggins, supra note 2, at 21.

11

Id.

12

See id.

13

See id.
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reserves.14 Under the Organic Act, Presidents shall create national forests only
“to improve and protect the forest within the boundaries, or for the purpose of
securing favorable conditions of water flows, and to furnish a continuous supply of
timber for the use and necessities of citizens of the United States.”15 The Organic
Act remained the Forest Service charter for almost a century.16
Soon after passage of the Organic Act, forester Gifford Pinchot became Chief of
the Division of Forestry.17 Pinchot’s philosophy on forest management emphasized
efficiency; he sought to use forest resources as efficiently as practicable.18 This
stance often placed him at odds with advocates not only of extractive resource
development, timber companies, and miners, but also the nascent preservationist
movement.19 This philosophy left no room for a recreation interest; indeed, there
is no indication that recreation was even the remotest consideration for Pinchot.
This philosophy generated a starting point for considering agency evolution on
recreation issues.20
Before this evolution could begin, the Division of Forestry needed forests.
As the head of the Division of Forestry, later the Bureau of Forestry, within the
Department of Agriculture, Pinchot was a forester without forests; as laid out by
the Reserve Act, the nation’s forest reserves remained under the purview of the
Department of the Interior.21 In 1905, after seven years of lobbying from Pinchot,
Congress transferred the nation’s 6.3 million acres of forest reserves from the
Department of Interior to the Department of Agriculture, creating the national
forest system in its current form.22
The national forest system focused primarily on timber production.23 This
followed the ethos Pinchot laid out in a letter written the day Congress transferred
the national forests to the Department of Agriculture. In the letter, Pinchot stated,
“the water, wood and forage of the reserves are [to be] conserved and wisely used
for the benefit of the home builder first of all . . . .”24 The first Forest Service

14

16 U.S.C. § 475 (2012).

15

Id.

The Organic Act remained the agency’s charter until passage of the National Forest
Management Act of 1976. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600–1614 (2012).
16

17

See Coggins, supra note 2, at 21.

18

Id.

19

See Wilkinson, Charles, Crossing The Next Meridian 130 (1992).

20

See infra notes 29–65 and accompanying text.

See 16 U.S.C. § 471 (1891), repealed by Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976,
43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1782.
21

22

See Wilkinson, supra note 19, at 126.

23

See Coggins, supra note 2, at 21.

24

See Wilkinson, supra note 19, at 128.
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manual, the “Use Book,” directed that “timber, water, pasture, mineral and other
resources are for the use of the people. They may be obtained under reasonable
conditions, without delay. Legitimate improvements and business enterprises will
be encouraged.”25 Interpreted broadly, this is the first mention of encouraging
development of enterprises, including recreation facilities, for profit in national
forests.26 Still, the idea of recreation as an important or primary use of national
forest resources had not yet taken hold.27
As noted above, the Forest Service was created with a mission statement
discussing water and timber, not recreation.28 Finding a specific point at which
recreation became an active agency issue is difficult, but the 1915 Occupancy
Permit Act (Permit Act) is one possible springboard.29 The Permit Act authorized
the Forest Service to issue permits for home sites, resort sites, and similar
recreation-oriented permits.30 The agency did not generate a great deal of revenue,
and nascent recreation interest carried with it potential to bring much-needed
funds to the Forest Service.31 The Forest Service, recognizing revenue potential in
this growing interest, had pushed for the Act in part as a response to the pressure
to “make the agency pay.”32 District foresters therefore began inventorying the
national forests for sites suitable for recreation development.33
To accommodate the new recreation interest, the Forest Service had to evolve.
From its inception, the Forest Service was, not unsurprisingly, an organization
of foresters: men trained in silviculture and similar vocations.34 It lacked voices
trained in the disciplines necessary to create a recreation infrastructure: designers
of recreation sites, trail builders, and planners, for instance.35 The agency needed
to hire personnel trained and prepared to establish this new infrastructure. Faced
with budget shortfalls, however, it was unable to do so.36
The increase in recreation for which the Forest Service was preparing occurred
quickly as technology and infrastructure advanced. With the advent of the
25

Id. (emphasis added).

26

See id.

27

See id.

28

See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text.

Hays, Samuel P., The American People & The National Forests 69 (2007). The Term
Permit Act of 1915 is codified at 16 U.S.C. § 407 (2014).
29

30

Hays, supra note 29, at 69.

31

See id.

32

Id.

Id. Author Aldo Leopold served as a district forester for District 3 in the Southwest during
this time. Id.
33

34

See id. at 70.

35

See id.

36

Id.
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automobile and increased road-building in the national forests, outdoor recreation
soon became accessible to all socioeconomic strata.37 Outdoor recreation, with
its roots in the late 1910s, accelerated every year—even through the Great
Depression—with only a small slowdown during World War II.38 Faced with
ever-increasing crowds of car campers, personnel shortage issues rapidly became
a problem for the Forest Service.39 Forest Service officials argued ceaselessly for
increased funding to accommodate the increasing recreation demand, which soon
began to loom inexorably above foresters’ heads.40
Coping with the recreation demand was an ongoing source of puzzlement and
concern for agency officials. “There is no point in trying to explain this recreational
urge of our people,” stated befuddled Rocky Mountain region forester John
Spencer in 1947.41 “Its existence and its imperious demands are demonstrated
facts which we cannot ignore.”42 Indeed, campers became somewhat of a
nuisance for a Forest Service thoroughly unprepared for their numbers and persistence.43 Doubly vexing was the fact recreationalists provided little to no income
to the agency.44
As recreation demand grew, it became apparent the agency had to find a
way to either monetize the rapidly growing recreation interest or increase its
funding base.45 In 1957, the Forest Service unveiled “Operation Outdoors,” a
five-year program for national forest recreation development.46 The Eisenhower
administration strongly supported the plan, and Congress listened; in 1958,
Forest Service funding grew from $4 million to $9 million annually.47 For the first
time in its history, the Forest Service could hire a full-time recreation staff, easing
pressure on long-suffering foresters.48

37

See id.

38

Id.

Recreation visits in the national forests rose from 18 million in 1946 to 52.5 million ten
years later. Lewis, James G., The Forest Service and the Greatest Good: A Centennial History
126 (2005). In 2002, the Forest Service hosted 214 million outdoor recreationists. See Coggins,
supra note 2, at 908.
39

40

Hays, supra note 29, at 71.

41

Id.

42

Id.

43

See id.

See id. In some cases, recreationalists cost the Forest Service money and resources by
carelessly starting forest fires. Id. Indeed, Smokey the Bear made his debut only three years before
Spencer’s lamenting the inexplicable camping hordes. Id.
44

45

See Lewis, supra note 39, at 126.

46

Id.

47

Id.

48

Id.
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Amidst this increase in recreation, construction demands brought on by
World War II and the postwar construction boom led to exponential growth in
the annual timber cut.49 By 1966, timber cut grew to six times its prewar level.50
Mounting pressure on the Forest Service and a realization of the finite nature of
the timber resource led to passage of the 1960 Multiple-Use, Sustained-Yield Act
(MUSY).51 The Congressional declaration of purpose opening MUSY reads: “It
is the policy of the Congress that the national forests are established and shall be
administered for outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and
fish purposes.”52 MUSY departed from the Organic Act by explicitly including
outdoor recreation as a purpose for establishing national forests.
Recreation demand continually increased following passage of MUSY,53
while federal appropriations for recreation operation and maintenance flat-lined
or decreased.54 As a result, the agency turned to third parties to help alleviate the
financial burden the national forests were becoming.55
Agency guidance directed the Forest Service to install “simple, moderate-rate
resorts . . . . Where public funds are not available for this purpose, such installations
will be permitted by private enterprise, but under permit requirements which retain
government control of the type of development and the quality and cost of services
rendered.”56 Over the past thirty years, as recreation visits increased, the Forest
Service drastically increased reliance on private third parties—concessionaires.57
The increase in recreation visits and popularity also led to increased concession
management of other profitable recreation facilities, such as heavily visited picnic
areas, boat launches, and trailheads.58 The end result of this increase is striking.
More than half of all Forest Service camping sites—eighty-two percent of camping
sites available for reservation through the National Recreation Reservation
Service—are managed by concessionaires.59 Indeed, many national forests no
longer contain any Forest Service-managed recreation sites.60 Across the Forest

49

See Coggins, supra note 2, at 21.

50

See id.

51

See id. The Multiple-Use, Sustained-Yield Act is codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 528–531 (2012).

52

16 U.S.C. § 528 (2012).

Tom Quinn, Public Lands and Private Recreation Enterprise, USDA Forest Service 14
(2002), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/pnw/pubs/gtr556.pdf.
53

54

Id. at 15.

55

See id.

56

Id. at 14 (emphasis added).

57

See infra notes 58– 63 and accompanying text.

58

Quinn, supra note 53, at 23.

Proposed Directives for Forest Service Concession Campground Special Use Permits, 74
Fed. Reg. 62,736 (Dec. 1, 2009).
59

60

See Richard, supra note 1.
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Service’s Rocky Mountain Region, including lands in Kansas, Nebraska, South
Dakota, Wyoming, and Colorado, about sixty percent of all campgrounds are
managed by concessionaires.61 In Colorado, seven national forests covering 14.5
million acres contain 1,268 non-fee sites and 540 fee areas, with 469 recreation
sites managed by concessionaires.62 Recreation is big business: today, spending by
recreation visitors in areas surrounding national forests amounts to nearly $13
billion per year,63 resulting in a contribution of more than $14 billion to the
United States gross domestic product.64
The Forest Service’s relationship with third party concessionaires is an
indelible aspect of national forest recreation. This relationship developed as a
response to an unexpected boom in recreation. This article explores the caveats of
concessionaires managing land or facilities. To do this fully, however, first requires
discussing the nature of the concessionaire’s relationship with the agency and the
source of rights or privileges granted under a concession permit.65

III. Concession Permitting
MUSY, together with the Organic Act, the 1915 Occupancy Permit Act, and
the 1976 National Forest Management Act (NFMA),66 form the foundation for
Forest Service recreation permitting. Under the Organic Act, the Forest Service
may regulate “occupancy and use” of the national forests.67 Courts interpret this
to mean that permits are generally required for conducting recreational activities
for profit on national forest land.68 Permits to operate government-owned
campgrounds and related concessions require additional, specific authority.69
With regards to actual on-the-ground management of recreation sites, the
Forest Service Manual 70 and the Forest Service Concession Desk Guide 71 give
some insight into agency decision making regarding concession permits. First, the
Proposed Directions for Forest Service Concession Campground Special Use Permits, 74
Fed. Reg. 62,736, 62,737 (Dec. 1, 2009).
61

62

Id.

U.S.D.A. Forest Service, Fiscal Year 2012 Budget Overview 12 (2012), available at
http://www.fs.fed.us/aboutus/budget/2012/justification/FY2012-USDA-Forest-Service-overview.pdf.
63

64

Id.

65

See infra Part III.

66

16 U.S.C. § 1600 (2012).

67

See 16 U.S.C. § 551 (2012).

See United States v. Brown, 200 F.3d 710 (10th Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Hells
Canyon Guide Service, Inc., 600 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1981).
68

69

This authority comes from § 7 of the Granger-Thye Act, 16 U.S.C. § 580(d) (2012).

Forest Service, Forest Service Manual, FSM 2300—Recreation, Wilderness, and Related
Resource Management, Chapter 2340—Privately Provided Recreation Opportunities (2006).
70

71

Forest Service, Campground Concession Desk Guide (1998).
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agency can choose to manage a site itself.72 Under Forest Service management,
operation and maintenance costs are paid from Forest Service funds, and use
fees are paid directly to the Treasury.73 The agency can choose to manage the site
remotely through the use of a periodically checked fee station.74 If on-site presence
is required, it can be provided through volunteer hosts or other agency programs.
The Forest Service cites two objectives for managing sites in this manner. Forest
Service management “benefits the agency by providing a service to the public,
and it benefits [the volunteer or host] by offering an opportunity to engage in
recreational activities on the National Forests, while contributing to the agency’s
recreation program.”75 The agency generally utilizes Forest Service management
for popular sites without the economy of scale to support a concessionairemanaged site.76
Second, the agency can award a permit to a concessionaire to manage
facilities.77 The agency’s stated objective in awarding permits is to “provide a
diversity of recreation activities that emphasizes the forest setting and rustic,
natural resource-based recreation opportunities.”78 Where a concession involves
private operation of government-owned recreation facilities, the government
establishes a Granger-Thye concession.79 Under Granger-Thye, the agency
issues permits for the operation and maintenance of existing government-owned
recreation facilities.80 Permit holders may make capital improvement additions
or changes to government-owned improvements or sites with Forest Service
appropriated funds.81 They may also make improvements to a site contingent
on an agreement that improvements and their value accrue to the ownership and
benefit of the federal government.82 To be successful, Granger-Thye concessions
require use and efficiency of operation that ultimately allow recovery of operation
and maintenance costs.83
72

Id.

73

Id.

74

Id.

75

Id.

76

Id.

77

Id.

78

Forest Service Manual, supra note 70, at 15.

79

Id at 22; see also supra note 71 and accompanying text.

80

Forest Service Manual, supra note 70, at 15.

81

Id.

82

Id.

Forest Service Concession Desk Guide, supra note 71. This leads to an obvious question:
if a Granger-Thye concession requires high enough levels of use to cover operation and maintenance
costs, what is the advantage to the public? In discussing recovery of costs and revenue generally,
the distinction between government-owned and privately-owned improvements is paramount. The
Forest Service “does not have the authority to retain land use fees for concession permits involving
privately owned improvements, including the part of the fees attributable to advertising and
83
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When the Forest Service issues a permit to manage land, regardless of type,
the legal nature of the right granted is unclear. In general, concession permits do
not create vested, protectable property interests.84 Instead, the grant is a special
use permit; the Forest Service retains significant authority over concessionaires’
activities and decisions.85
Though the legal nature of the right granted is somewhat unclear, these
permits give exclusivity that protects concessionaires from competition with other
entities. The relationship between the agency and the concessionaire is analogous
to the government’s relationship with public utilities. The idea that when private
property is “affected with a public interest,” it is subject to government regulation
and control is a cornerstone of public policy law.86 There are many theories as to
when the government should regulate private entities in the name of the public
interest. The most appropriate theory providing an analogy to the concession
relationship is the government function theory, which suggests that regulation is
warranted when a business is performing a public or governmental function as
an agent of the state.87 In such situations, the company is “the substitute for the
State” in performing that function.88
As applied to recreation enterprises operating on public lands, third-party
campground and trailhead operators clearly serve as a “substitute for the State” in
their operations. Concessionaires perform a governmental function in managing
and overseeing significant portions of federal lands. It is therefore reasonable to
conclude that recreation enterprises operating on the public lands—similar to
private property used in providing public utility service—are “affected with a
public interest.”89 Thus, the Forest Service, as the agency providing permits and

sponsorship revenues.” Advertising and Sponsorship in Connection With Concessions Involving
Privately Owned Improvements on National Forest System Lands, 78 Fed. Reg. 27,941, 27,944
(May 13, 2013). Rather, these fees are deposited into the U.S. Treasury. Id.
84
See Paulina Lake Historic Cabin Owners Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture Forest Service,
577 F. Supp. 1188, 1193 n.2 (D. Or. 1983). Therein, the court stated that the law is settled that
“special use permits create no vested property rights.” The court then analogized special use permits
to grazing permits.

See Mount Evans Co. v. Madigan, 14 F.3d 1444 (10th Cir. 1994). The “Crest House” atop
Mount Evans in Colorado, a facility constructed by a private company under a special use permit,
burned down. The Forest Service decided not to rebuild the house, and the company sued. The
court held that the decision not to rebuild was not made in an arbitrary or capricious manner, that
the agency retained the authority to prevent the company from rebuilding, and that the decision was
supported by the Forest Service’s use of significant data in making the decision.
85

86

Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 128–29 (1877).

Tom Quinn, A Public Utility Model for Managing Public Land Recreation Enterprises, Gen.
Tech. Rep. PNW-GTR-543, 14 (2002) (citing Missouri ex rel. Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service
Comm’n, 262 U.S. 276 (1922)).
87

88

Missouri, 262 U.S. at 291.

89

See Quinn, supra note 87, at 22.
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authority to operate on the public lands, is well within its power as the regulating
entity to regulate prices charged by concessionaires.

IV. The Federal Lands Recreation Enhancement Act
Since the increase in recreation demand on national forests, the agency
has been searching for ways to “make the agency pay.”90 Specifically, the Forest
Service needed authority and mechanisms to generate revenue. The Land and
Water Conservation Fund Act 91 traditionally governed the authority of the
Forest Service to charge fees for recreational access to national forests. In 1996,
Congress adopted a three-year recreation fee demonstration program to meet the
increased recreation demand without additional appropriations.92 The program
allowed federal agencies to retain all recreation fees generated on agency land.93
Eighty percent of those fees were to be spent at the unit—in the case of the Forest
Service, the national forest—where they were collected.94
In 2004, Congress declined reauthorization of the fee demonstration
program.95 Its replacement, the FLREA,96 built upon the basic framework of the
fee demonstration program, retained the principle that fees collected should be
used locally.97 The agency still retains all fees, with sixty to eighty percent used at
the unit where they are collected.98 The remaining revenue may be used anywhere
within the agency.99

90

See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text.

16 U.S.C. § 460 (2012). The Land and Water Conservation Fund, which still exists,
provides funds for federal, state, and local governments to purchase land, water, and wetlands.
Lands purchased through the fund are used to provide recreational opportunities. Revenue for the
fund comes largely from fees paid by offshore oil and gas operators. See U.S. Forest Service, LWCF
Purchases (2014), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/land/staff/LWCF/index.shtml.
91

92

Pub. L. 104-134, § 315 (1996).

93

See id.

94

Id.

Congress’ denial for reauthorization came after numerous complaints and Congressional
extensions concerning the fee demonstration program. Common complaints with the program
included: (1) fees erect barriers keeping lower-income citizens from enjoying the public lands;
(2) charging entrance fees to public lands represents double taxation, charging fees for entrance
to lands maintained and set apart by federal tax dollars; and more foundationally, (3) such fees
represent a commercialization of public lands anathema to the reasons why the lands were originally
set aside. The program, though unpopular, was extended several times for lack of a better solution.
95

96

16 U.S.C. §§ 6801– 6814 (2012).

97

See id.

98

See id.

99

See id.
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After the widely derided fee demonstration program, trust in the federal land
management agencies fee decisions was low.100 The fees charged under the fee
demo program had no overarching structure. While all people are theoretically
entitled to enter national forests without paying,101 fee requirements under the fee
demo program were not consistent across the federal land management agencies.
In a House of Representatives committee report, Representative Richard Pombo
stated that the FLREA’s specific, prescriptive fee requirements were intended to
alleviate concerns of those who no longer trust certain federal
land management agencies with the recreation fee authority.
For example, the amendment made clear that the USFS and the
BLM will not be permitted to charge solely for parking, scenic
pullouts and other non-developed areas while the NPS and the
FWS may continue to charge an entrance fee.102
Pursuant to these concerns, the FLREA specifically provides that the Forest
Service shall not charge an entrance fee for federal recreational lands managed by the
agency.103 However, the Forest Service may charge for access to specific amenities.104
Specifically, the FLREA states that “[e]xcept as limited by subsection (d), the Secretary may charge a standard amenity recreation fee for Federal recreational
lands and waters under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Land Management, the
Bureau of Reclamation, or the Forest Service.”105 The Act only allows charges at:
(1) national conservation areas; (2) national volcanic monuments; (3) destination
visitor or interpretive centers providing a broad range of interpretive services,
programs and media; or (4) an area that provides significant outdoor recreation
opportunities, substantial Federal investments, where fees can be efficiently
collected, and which “contains all of the following amenities: designated developed
parking, a permanent toilet facility, a permanent trash receptacle, interpretive sign,
exhibit, or kiosk, picnic tables[,] and security services.”106
The FLREA also contains a list of specific limitations on amenity recreation
fees.107 The Forest Service may not charge any standard amenity recreation fee
or expanded amenity recreation fee for federal recreational lands and waters they
administer for any of the following:

100

See id.

101

See 16 U.S.C. § 6802(e)(2) (2012).

102

H.R. Rep. No. 108-790(I), at 14 (2004), reprinted in 2004 WL 2920863, at *18.

103

See id.

104

16 U.S.C. §§ 6801– 6814 (2012).

105

16 U.S.C. § 6802(f ) (2012).

106

Id.

107

16 U.S.C. § 6802(d) (2012).
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(A) Solely for parking, undesignated parking, or picnicking along
roads or trailsides.
(B) For general access unless specifically authorized under
this section.
(C) For dispersed areas with low or no investment unless specifically
authorized under this section.
(D) For persons who are driving through, walking through,
boating through, horseback riding through, or hiking through
Federal recreational lands and waters without using the facilities
and services.
(E) For camping at undeveloped sites that do not provide a
minimum number of facilities and services as described in
subsection (g)(2)(A).
(F)

For use of overlooks or scenic pullouts.

(G) For travel by private, noncommercial vehicle over any national
parkway or any road or highway established as a part of the
Federal-aid System, as defined in section 101 of title 23, United
States Code, which is commonly used by the public as a means
of travel between two places either or both of which are outside
any unit or area at which recreation fees are charged under this
Act [16 USCS §§ 6801–6814].
(H) For travel by private, noncommercial vehicle, boat, or aircraft
over any road or highway, waterway, or airway to any land in
which such person has any property right if such land is within
any unit or area at which recreation fees are charged under this
Act [16 USCS §§ 6801–6814].
(I)

For any person who has a right of access for hunting or fishing
privileges under a specific provision of law or treaty.

(J)

For any person who is engaged in the conduct of official
Federal, State, Tribal, or local government business.

(K) For special attention or extra services necessary to meet the
needs of the disabled.108

108

Id.
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The FLREA is an extremely lucrative fee program for the Forest Service. The
agency collects approximately $65 million annually from recreation fees.109 One
could say the FLREA and the concession system has been the ultimate way to
“make the agency pay.”110

V. High Impact Recreation Areas—Testing the
Boundaries of the Fee Requirement
Despite seemingly strict amenity requirements, the Forest Service developed
methods to circumvent the strict legal fee requirements. A recent line of recreation
fee cases indicates courts’ willingness to hold the Forest Service to the FLREA fee
requirements despite the agency’s efforts to find ways around the requirement
that certain amenities exist at a site before a fee can be charged for use of that
site.111 After the FLREA’s 2004 enactment, the Forest Service issued interim
implementation guidelines for new fee requirements allowing the agency to avoid
the FLREA’s amenity requirements.112 The agency authorized itself to create
“High Impact Recreation Areas” (HIRA) by consolidating many smaller areas
into one larger area.113 The interim guidelines described a HIRA as:
A clearly delineated, contiguous area with specific, tightly defined
boundaries and clearly defined access points (such that visitors
can easily identify the fee area boundaries on the ground or on
a map/sign; that supports or sustains concentrated recreation
use; and that provides opportunities for outdoor recreation that
are directly associated with a natural or cultural feature, place,
or activity (i.e., waterway, canyon, travel corridor, geographic
attraction, the recreation attraction).114
The interim guidelines provided for charging standard amenity recreation
fees at HIRAs meeting FLREA requirements.115 The guidelines required that a
HIRA provide the six required amenities specified in the FLREA and that those
Forest Service, 2013 Budget Justification, 12–8 (2013), http://www.fs.fed.us/aboutus/
budget/2013/fy2013-justification.pdf.
109

110

See supra note 32 and accompanying text.

See Adams v. U.S. Forest Serv., 671 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 2012); Smith v. U.S. Forest Serv.,
740 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1118 (D. Ariz. 2010).
111

112
Smith, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 1118. The guidelines can be found in: Forest Service, Federal
Lands Recreation Enhancement Act—Forest Service Interim Implementation Guidelines (Apr. 22,
2005), http://www.fs.fed.us/passespermits/docs/final-guidelines.pdf.
113

See Smith, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 1118.

See id. (citation omitted); Forest Service, supra note 109, at 9. It is important to note
that the HIRA is a creature entirely of the Forest Service’s making. The HIRA classification was not
authorized by the FLREA, and seems to have been created in order to aggregate amenities to charge
de facto entrance fees at access points at which fees would not be warranted under the FLREA.
114

115

See Forest Service, supra note 109.
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amenities be integrated into and accessible in the area in order to reasonably
accommodate visitors.116 The guidelines also stated that though a HIRA could
not include an entire administrative unit, such as an entire national forest, a
“collection” of recreation sites could be aggregated to create a HIRA.117
In promulgating these guidelines, the Forest Service triggered public com
ment requirements, including the agency’s own internal regulatory requirement
mandated by the FLREA public notice and comment provisions, mandating
public notice and comment.118 Despite this, however, the Forest Service did not
provide the public with an opportunity for notice and comment.119
In addition to these issues, the substance of the interim implementation
guidelines themselves has been the subject of litigation. Two specific cases discuss
the guidelines and the use of HIRAs to circumvent the fee requirements: Smith v.
U.S. Forest Service and Adams v. U.S. Forest Service.

A. Smith v. U.S. Forest Service
In Smith,120 the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona examined
an attempt by the Forest Service to maneuver around the FLREA’s amenity
requirement by designating a particular recreation area as a HIRA.121 In 2009,
Smith parked his car at the Vultee Arch Trailhead in Arizona’s Coconino National
Forest to hike the Dry Creek Trail, intending to backpack overnight and return
to his car later without using any amenities.122 Upon return, he found a Forest
Service citation on his vehicle for failure to pay a recreation fee.123 The citation
was issued pursuant to 36 C.F.R. § 261.17 (2010), providing that “[f ]ailure to
pay any recreation fee is prohibited.” The FLREA provides that failure to pay
a recreation fee is a Class A or B misdemeanor,124 and the term “recreation fee”
includes a standard amenity recreation fee.125
116

See Smith, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 1119.

117

Id.

See id.; see also 68 U.S.C. § 6802(b)(5) (2014) (requiring the Forest Service to obtain input
from Recreation Advisory Committees (RACs) as provided in 68 U.S.C. § 6803).
118

119
See Smith, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 1119. The Forest Service argued that because the pass program
used in the area was in existence prior to the enactment of the FLREA, it was therefore exempt from
the public notice and comment requirements of the FLREA. See id. “A cursory examination of the
FLREA,” stated the court, “contradicts this contention.” Id. Pursuant to an interagency agreement
between the BLM and the Forest Service, the BLM’s RACs had offered to review the Red Rock
HIRA. The Forest Service refused.
120

Id. at 1111.

121

See id.

122

Id. at 1114.

123

Id.

124

See 16 U.S.C. § 6811(d) (2014).

125

See 16 U.S.C. § 6801(8) (2014).
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The defendant challenged the citation, claiming the fee requirement for
parking at an undeveloped trailhead to hike and camp in undeveloped locations
is void because it is ultra vires, or beyond the Forest Service’s Congressionally
delegated authority under the FLREA.126 The defendant argued that the site
where he parked did not contain the FLREA required amenities for “areas” where
an amenity fee may be charged, and that the fee requirement at the Vultee Arch
Trailhead was therefore not authorized by the FLREA.127 The defendant next
asserted that no reasonable person could be on notice that parking at the trailhead
would require paying a fee based on FLREA fee provisions requiring amenities
not plainly available at that trailhead.128 The Forest Service countered, claiming
their interpretation of the FLREA allowed them to create HIRA “areas” where fees
could be charged by combining sites without the required amenities with areas
that did contain the required amenities.129
The court addressed two main issues.130 First, the court reviewed the Forest
Service’s creation and history to determine the agency’s authority to impose fees.131
Second, it considered whether the trailhead was in fact part of the Red Rock
HIRA.132 Regarding the first issue, the court noted the only existing authority
for charging the defendant a fee for use of a National Forest is the FLREA.133
Accordingly, if the fee at issue was beyond FLREA authority, the fee was ultra vires,
and the citation lacked authorization.134 The court ultimately held the fee beyond
FLREA authority because the defendant’s use of the National Forest was limited
to driving to and from a parking area and parking overnight at an undeveloped
parking area that contained none of the FLREA-required amenities.135 The court
reviewed the listed amenities, ultimately concluding that for this reason, the
Vultee Arch Trailhead was not an “area” where a fee could be charged.136 The
FLREA therefore did not authorize the Forest Service to charge the defendant the
fee at issue.137

126

See Smith, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 1114.

127

See id.

128

See id.

129

See id. at 1115.

130

See id. at 1121 (citing United States v. Mandel, 914 F.2d 1215, 1220 –21 (9th Cir. 1990)).

131

See id. at 1121.

132

See id.

133

See id.

134

See id. at 1124.

135

Id. at 1121.

136

Id. at 1124.

137

See id.
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The court then reviewed the Forest Service’s argument that the fee was
authorized due to the trailhead’s inclusion in the Red Rock HIRA.138 The Red
Rock HIRA encompassed more than 160,000 acres, nearly five times the size
of other HIRAs.139 It was not a clearly delineated, contiguous area with specific,
tightly defined boundaries.140 It contained portions of three different wilderness
areas and ranged through steep canyons with ill-defined boundaries.141 These
conditions ran contrary to the requirement that visitors be easily able to identify
the fee area boundaries on the ground or on a map.142 The court ultimately held
the Red Rock HIRA beyond the scope of a HIRA as contemplated by the interim
guidelines.143 The court held that charging an amenity fee anywhere within the
Red Rock HIRA was contrary to the clear statutory language of the FLREA.144
The court therefore dismissed the citation as inconsistent with the FLREA.145

B. Adams v. U.S. Forest Service
In Adams v. U.S. Forest Service, the Ninth Circuit confronted a similar issue
to those examined in Smith: the FLREA’s amenity requirement.146 The case
concerned the Mt. Lemmon HIRA in Arizona’s Coronado National Forest.147 The
Forest Service collected fees from all drivers parking vehicles along a stretch of the
28-mile Catalina Highway—the only paved road leading to the summit of Mt.
Lemmon.148 Following enactment of the FLREA, the Forest Service designated
that stretch of the Catalina Highway an HIRA.149 This HIRA did contain the
FLREA required amenities.150 The agency therefore maintained fee requirements
at the Mt. Lemmon HIRA, with one exception: visitors who drive through the
area without stopping are not charged a fee.151 Visitors who drove into the HIRA,
parked their cars and hiked or camped in undeveloped areas accessible from the
highway were charged a fee regardless of whether or not they used the amenities.152
Four recreational visitors sued the Forest Service seeking a declaration that the
138

Id. at 1125.

139

See id. at 1126 –27.

140

Id.

141

Id. at 1128.

142

See id.

143

See id. at 1127.

144

See id. at 1128.

145

Id.

146

671 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 2012).

147

Id.

148

See id. at 1139– 40.

149

See id. at 1141– 42.

150

See id.

151

Id. at 1142.

152

Id.
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Forest Service exceeded the scope of its fee-charging authority under the FLREA
by charging fees to those who drove to Mount Lemmon, parked, and accessed
undeveloped areas without using the amenities.153 The Forest Service moved to
dismiss the case, and the motion was granted. The plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth
Circuit.154 The issue on appeal was whether the Forest Service violated the FLREA
by collecting a standard amenity recreation fee for solely parking and accessing
undeveloped areas in the Mt. Lemmon HIRA.155
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit recognized that the FLREA permits the Forest
Service to charge a standard amenity recreation fee in an area with amenities and
characteristics described in the Act, even though those stated amenities were not
accessible along the exact stretch of the highway where the plaintiffs parked. 156
The court further noted, however, that the FLREA specifically prohibits the
Forest Service from charging a fee—even in a place where a § 6802(f ) would
permit it—for “certain activities or services.”157 Section 6802(f ) provides that
even in locations where all listed amenities are present, the Forest Service still
cannot charge a fee solely for parking, passing through, picnicking, or camping
where parties are not actually taking advantage of any listed amenities.158 As
noted above, the FLREA also prohibits fees, among other things: “[f ]or persons
who are driving through, walking through, boating through, horseback riding
through, or hiking through Federal recreational lands and waters without using
the facilities and services;” and “[f ]or camping at undeveloped sites that do not
provide a minimum number of facilities and services as described under 16 U.S.C.
§ 6802(g)(2)(A).”159
The Forest Service argued that the fee at issue was not “solely for parking”
because the HIRA included the listed amenities, whether or not visitors used those
amenities.160 If the agency could charge fees for parking in a HIRA containing the
listed amenities, however, this would run contrary to the FLREA’s prohibition
on fees charged solely for parking This interpretation would weaken the fee
prohibition and defy the legislative intent behind that prohibition.161 According
to the court, the FLREA contemplates individuals entering areas offering the listed

153

Id. at 1140.

154

Id.

155

Id.

Id. This is the essential quality of the Forest Service’s HIRA program. The listed amenities
are present in the HIRA, though they may not be present at the exact point at which a visitor parks
or accesses the area.
156

157

16 U.S.C. § 6802(d)(1) (2012).

158

Id.

159

Id.

160

See Adams, 671 F.3d at 1144.

161

Id.
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amenities without taking advantage of those amenities.162 Allowing the Forest
Service to operate under its advocated interpretation ignores and negates the
statutory fee charging requirements.163 The Ninth Circuit, citing the freestanding
prohibition on fees for the listed activities or services, ultimately held the FLREA
unambiguously prohibited the Mount Lemmon fee structure.164
These cases show the agency’s attempts to circumvent the FLREA fee
requirements. They also demonstrate the growing backlash against attempts to
monetize access to federal lands. In addressing the issue of paying to access federal
lands, the FLREA put into practice a powerful incentive for the Forest Service to
continue increasing use of third party management in national forests.

VI. Recreation Passes, Public Comment, and the Poison Pill
The Forest Service’s HIRA program is not the only way the agency avoids
the amenity fee requirements. The FLREA itself contains a brief but incredibly
powerful clause allowing the agency, in cooperation with concessionaires, to
circumvent the fee and amenity requirements of the Act altogether. To understand
the impact of this clause, one must explore the additional programs the FLREA
established, specifically the recreation pass program and public comment process.
The FLREA does more than just delineate circumstances under which the
Forest Service can charge fees; it also creates a system of recreation passes granting
access to federal lands.165 For example, the America the Beautiful pass, also known
as the interagency pass, covers entrance and standard amenity recreation fees for
all federal recreational lands and waters for which a standard amenity recreation
fee is charged.166 The FLREA makes the America the Beautiful pass, normally $80,
$10 for senior citizens and free to disabled persons.167 The FLREA provides for
establishing other site-specific and regional passes covering entrance and standard
amenity fees for particular federal lands and waters.168
In addition to the recreation pass program, the FLREA also establishes
a process for public notice and comment on recreation fees. To foster public
participation in fee decisions, the FLREA states that prior to establishing a new fee
area, the agency must promulgate guidelines for public involvement and agency

Id. at 1144 –45. The court cited § 6802(d)(1)(D) (2012), specifically prohibiting fees for
those driving, walking, riding or boating through an area without using facilities or services.
162

163

Id. at 1145.

164

Id. at 1143.

165

See 16 U.S.C. § 6804 (2012).

166

Id. at (a)(1).

167

Id. at (b).

168

Id.
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procedures for informing the public about fee revenues.169 These guidelines must
be published in the Federal Register.170 Furthermore, the FLREA requires the
agency provide the public with “opportunities to participate in the development
of or changing of a recreation fee.”171 The FLREA requires the agency publish
notice in the Federal Register regarding establishment of a new recreation fee
area six months prior to the fee taking effect.172 Notice regarding changes to
existing FLREA fees must be published in local newspapers and publications near
the site of the proposed change.173 The FLREA further establishes Recreation
Resource Advisory Committees (RRACs).174 RRACs make recommendations
to the Secretary of Agriculture regarding standard amenity recreation fees and
expanded amenity recreation fees whenever these recommendations relate to
public concerns—broad concerns which include implementation or elimination
of fees and the expansion of fee programs.175
After establishing the recreation pass and public notice and comment
programs, the drafters of the FLREA also included the FLREA, containing a brief
passage, a poison pill that—almost as an afterthought given the extensive presence
of third-party concessionaires on the public lands—casts a great deal of doubt
on these programs and the law itself. The passage provides “[n]otwithstanding
any other provision of this Act, . . . a third party may charge a fee for providing
a good or service to a visitor of a unit or area of the Federal land management
agencies in accordance with any other applicable law or regulation.”176 Quite
simply, concessionaires are not required to honor any passes for standard amenity
recreation fee day-use sites, nor are they required to participate in public notice
and comment. As noted above, Adams and Smith arose out of controversies on
federal land administered by the Forest Service.177 Had the lands in question been
run by a concessionaire, the outcomes could—and probably would—have been
different. It seems that given the poison pill—the “notwithstanding” clause—a
concessionaire can charge entrance fees for national forest visitors, thereby
completely circumventing the FLREA’s amenity fee requirements.178 This renders
useless all of the protections, passes, and incentives provided for in the FLREA,
raises obstacles to the public’s use of their lands and nullifies the law’s drafters’
attempts to subsidize and encourage outdoor recreation.
169

Id. at (c).

170

Id.

171

16 U.S.C. § 6803 (2012).

172

Id. at (b).

173

Id.

174

See id. at (d).

175

Id.

176

16 U.S.C. § 6813(e) (2012).

177

See supra notes 109– 63 and accompanying text.

See Bobby Magill, USFS will no Longer make Passholders pay at Brainard, Bellaire, Chambers
Lake Fee Areas, The Fort Collins Coloradoan, May 24, 2013.
178
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VII. Brainard Lake Case Study
As an illustration of the on-the-ground consequences of concessionaire
exemptions from the FLREA’s requirements, consider Brainard Lake National
Recreation Area near Ward, Colorado. Brainard Lake is a glacial lake surrounded
by a subalpine forest in a spectacular, glacially carved valley.179 The recreation area
includes several campgrounds, hiking trails, developed trailheads with bathroom
facilities, and parking.180 Brainard Lake is run by concessionaire American Land
and Leisure.181
Brainard Lake serves as an access point to many trails within the Indian Peaks
Wilderness Area.182 Like the areas previously discussed, visitors must pay for
access to Brainard Lake regardless of whether or not they use any of the provided
amenities.183 Hikers and backpackers entering the wilderness must park at Brainard
Lake and pay an entrance fee.184 No consideration is given to whether visitors are
coming to spend the day at Brainard Lake and use facilities located therein or
arriving simply to leave a vehicle at the trailhead for a hiking or backpacking trip.
Furthermore, until a 2013 agreement with the Forest Service, American Land
and Leisure planned to refuse to honor the America the Beautiful pass.185 This
agreement notwithstanding, the concessionaire could have chosen to not honor
the pass.186 All of this is made possible by the “notwithstanding” clause—the poison
pill of the FLREA.187 It is difficult to believe this consequence was unforeseen or
even unintended. The Forest Service could easily remedy this situation. Nothing
written in the FLREA (“Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act . . .”)188
prohibits the Forest Service from enacting its own regulatory provisions imposing
all of the FLREA’s amenity requirements in permits issued to concessionaires who
wished to charge fees. Indeed, the agency’s internal rulemaking process to enact
such a provision would not even require congressional approval.
The “notwithstanding” clause, unlike the amenity fee issues described above,
has not been challenged. While plaintiffs challenge the entrance/amenity fee
issue in court, the “notwithstanding” clause and Forest Service policy have made
it difficult if not impossible to challenge concessionaires’ ability to completely
179

Id.

180

Id.

Forest Service, Brainard Lake Recreation Area, www.fs.usda.gov/goto/arp/brainard
(last visited Apr. 30, 2014).
181

182

Id.

183

See supra notes 124 –68 and accompanying text.

184

See supra notes 124 –68 and accompanying text.

185

Magill, supra note 178; see supra Part VI.

186

See 16 U.S.C. § 6813(e) (2012).

187

See id.

188

Id. (emphasis added).
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ignore recreation passes. The agency recognized the problems inherent in allowing
concessionaires to ignore the America the Beautiful pass, which covers entrance
fees for all recreational lands and waters where those fees are charged.189 In a series
of proposed directives issued in 2009, the agency stated:
A converse problem has emerged with [Special Amenity
Recreation Fee (SARF)] day use sites that are operated as
concessions. After enactment of (sic) REA, the Forest Service
took the position that concessioners should not be required to
provide free use at SARF sites to any Interagency Pass holders.
There were several reasons for this policy, including the need
to (1) Maintain eligibility for the regulatory exemption from
the Service Contract Act at 29 CFR 4.133(b) by not requiring
concessioners to provide extensive free services; (2) honor
the terms under which these concessions were offered; and
(3) maintain the economic viability of concessions.
However, not requiring concessioners to honor Interagency
Passes at SARF day use sites has resulted in misunderstanding by
some Interagency Pass holders, who expect to have their passes
honored at all SARF day use sites. The problem has created a
dilemma for the Forest Service. The Agency believes that all pass
holders should understand how their passes will be honored at
concessions. Additionally, the Agency believes that holders of
the Interagency Pass have a reasonable expectation that their
passes will be honored at all SARF day use sites.
However, it would not be economically viable to require
concessioners to provide free use to all Interagency Pass holders.
Not only were these costs not anticipated when the applications
for these concessions were submitted, but these requirements, in
addition to the camping fee discount, would be detrimental to
the economics of the concessions and could render many of them
nonviable. Furthermore, although camping fees are the primary
source of revenue for most concessions, for some, the primary
source of revenue is day use sites. Concessioners are concerned
that the Agency will remove these sites from concessions to
satisfy the expectations of Interagency Pass holders and thus
eliminate viable business opportunities.190

Proposed Directives for Forest Service Concession Campground Special Use Permits, 74
Fed. Reg. 62,736, 62,737 (Dec. 1, 2009); see also 15 U.S.C. § 6804 (2012); Smith, 740 F. Supp. 2d
at 1117.
189

Proposed Directives for Forest Service Concession Campground Special Use Permits, 74
Fed. Reg. at 62,738.
190
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The increasing concentration of concessionaire-operated sites in the national
forests combined with the FLREA’s “notwithstanding” clause perverts the
purposes for which the America the Beautiful pass was created by not allowing
universal use. While the FLREA takes strong steps to open federal lands to senior
citizens and persons with disabilities by offering discounted or free passes and
steps to foster public involvement in fee decisions,191 the practical application
of the “notwithstanding” clause completely eradicates those goals. Additionally,
the concessionaire exemption contradicts the FLREA goals. As noted above, the
FLREA was intended to restore public trust in the land management agencies
and establish a stable framework for administering recreation fees.192 Permitting
concessionaires to skirt fee requirements, ignore recreation passes, and avoid public
participation requirements engenders mistrust in the federal land management
agencies’ ability to wield fee authority in an equitable manner. Brainard Lake
serves as an example where concessionaires seeking to ignore the fee system
established in the FLREA, use the poison pill to do so. The disconnect between
provisions intended to ensure universal access to federal lands and third parties’
ability to skirt fee requirements raises the question—who is the proper steward of
recreation infrastructure in the national forests?

VIII. Who Should Manage Recreation Infrastructure
on Public Lands?
Given that concessionaires can freely ignore fee requirements, it seems
proper to ask whether concessionaires are indeed the proper parties to manage
recreation infrastructure. Why are profit-motivated third parties given free rein
and a friendly regulatory environment under which to operate on federal lands? If
enough money is available to permit extensive development on recreational lands
and permit concessionaires to make a profit, it would be simpler (and cheaper)
for the agency itself to handle these responsibilities. However, the agency may
argue that allowing concessionaires to run things is the only sustainable way to
accommodate the ever-increasing public demand for outdoor recreation on public
lands, given declining agency resources and current federal budget cuts.
Internal agency documents certainly seem to support using concessionaires in
light of the agency’s current situation.193 The agency’s 1988 National Recreation
Strategy expressed a desire to attract new sources of financing for recreation
investments.194 The agency wanted investors to seek out new funding sources as
an opportunity to provide “quality service while realizing a reasonable return.”195
Shortly afterwards, in 1992, an interagency document stated that the “mission of
191

See supra notes 177–83 and accompanying text.

See H.R. Rep. No. 108-790(I), supra note 102, at *18; see also supra notes 106–09 and
accompanying text.
192

193

See Quinn, supra note 87.

194

Id.

195

Id.
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the Forest Service is to provide for recreation by attracting private capital.”196 How
this focus can be squared with the agency’s other mission statements, such as those
asserted in the Organic Act, MUSY, and NFMA is unclear.
The steady increase in concession management represents gradual acceptance
by unit-level managers that concessionaires offer the only alternative to closing
facilities in the face of slowing agency funding. In 1997, a letter from agency
chief Mike Dombeck provided a glimpse into the struggle between increasing
the presence of profit-motivated third parties on the national forests and
maintaining the agency’s mission.197 Referring to the regions’ participation in the
fee demonstration program, Dombeck wrote:
Another strategy is to encourage an expanding role for the
private sector in delivering services in national forest settings.
Use of concessions is a key tool for providing benefits and
services to our customers, concessions also directly contribute
to ecosystem protection and enhancements while promoting
economic strength and stability in the communities we serve.198
Dombeck refers to recreational users of national forests not as guests, users, or
recreationists, but explicitly as “customers.”199 This distinction highlights the
Forest Service’s view of recreation users as a revenue stream. In its 2012 fiscal
year overview, the agency stated that it “works to efficiently maximize limited
resources and create a high return on investment for the American taxpayer.”200
The agency does not elaborate on the methods used—such as the increased
partnership with concessionaires—to “create a high return on investment” and
serve its “customers.”
A growing coalition of public lands users, nonprofits, and local organiza
tions—the very “customers” referred to in the letter quoted above—are rallying
against what they see as the industrialization and commercialization of the public
lands.201 This outlook is seen in comments to the proposed Forest Service direc

196
Id. (citing U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Report of the Concessions Management Task Force
Regarding Commercial Recreation Activities on Federal Lands (1992)).

Letter from Mike Dombeck, Chief, USDA Forest Service, to Regional Foresters (Feb. 25,
1997) (on file with author).
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Analysis Public Response To Proposed Changes in Interagency Pass Policy at ConcessionaireManaged Forest Service Recreation Sites (2010), available at http://www.westernslopenofee.
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tives discussed above.202 The proposed directives sought to change the discount
terms at concessionaire-managed Forest Service campgrounds for holders of senior
and disabled passes as well as the interagency pass.203 If enacted, the directives
would change agency policy so that instead of being required to offer holders of
senior and disabled passes a fifty percent discount, they would only be required
to offer a ten percent discount.204 Public comments were diverse, but overarching
themes included a desire to keep the national forests free from commercialization,
as well as a fierce opposition to the increasing presence of private entities as land
managers.205 A sampling of the comments includes: “I believe the awarding
of contracts to administer campgrounds and other public services should be
reversed and returned to supervision by forest service [sic] employees . . . No
commercialization of campgrounds, now or ever;”206 “Our national public land
system should not be managed by third party concessionaires. That job was given
to the specific agency to provide the best management possible for the land and
for the people. Please, do your job;”207 and
I am dismayed by the general movement toward privatization
which has inundated our government over the years. I fondly
remember the days when Forest Service employees, not private
contractors, greeted campers such as myself. Those employees
loved the woods and were instrumental in instilling that love and
appreciation into millions of visitors to our country’s outdoor
spaces. Concessionaires fulfill no such role;208
Concessionaire operated sites typically reflect a higher fee
structure than those operated by in-house Forest Service
employees. Their profit motive seems to be the modus operandi.
In addition, the concessionaire operated sites tend to isolate the
Forest Service from the day to day management of the area and
limits their ability to respond to recreational issues; 209
The concessionaires make plenty of money and I, personally,
have been disappointed in the manner some of them are keeping
our campgrounds . . . . My suggestion would be to get rid of
202

See supra Part VII.

The interagency pass, also known as the “America the Beautiful” pass, was created by the
FLREA. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6814 (2012).
203

204
Proposed Directives for Forest Service Concession Campground Special Use Permits, 74
Fed. Reg. 62,736, 62,739 (Dec. 1, 2009).
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See Western Slope No-Fee Coalition, supra note 201, at 5.
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concessionaires and turn the campgrounds back to the Forest
Service and let us have the campground receipts to maintain and
improve campgrounds.210
Of the 117 comments received via email, 116 opposed the changes.211 Of
the 151 comments received via regular mail, 150 opposed the changes.212 Even
the concessionaire firm Cradle of Forestry submitted a comment opposing the
proposed directives; they feared the policy change would anger its customers
and create problems for their employees.213 After the comment period closed,
the Forest Service withdrew the proposed directives citing public opposition.214
This shows that the agency considers citizen and interest group perspectives in
its decision-making process regarding concessionaires. It further evidences a
potential slowing of the shift of authority to concessionaires.
Still, change is slow for the Forest Service. Programmatic review of recreation
fees and concession programs is lacking even after cases like Adams and Smith. In
response to each successful challenge, the Forest Service changed policies at the
unit level. The agency, however, has been slow to take broad action.
In 2013, the Forest Service issued new directives regarding concession
recreation services.215 These directives are unlikely to assuage the fears of those
who believe that agency policy has skewed too far towards privatization and
commercialism. The directives expand the rights of concession permit holders
to advertise in certain buildings, winter sports facilities, and other recreation

210
Western Slope No-Fee Coalition, supra note 201, at 5. This comment is especially
telling, as it was written by a Forest Service employee.
211

Western Slope No-Fee Coalition, supra note 201, at 5.

Western Slope No-Fee Coalition, supra note 201, at 5. The vast majority of
comments—3,833 in total—were submitted through an online comment system at the regulations.
gov website. Of these, the Western Slope No-Fee Coalition reviewed every hundredth comment, 38
in total. Of these 38 comments, only one was supportive of the proposed directives. This comment
came from Steve Werner, the vice president of American Land and Leisure, the concessionaire that
operates Brainard Lake. In support of the proposal, Mr. Werner argued that concessionaires provide
a significant savings to the agency by absorbing operational and payroll costs. To the point that
concessionaires are not required to honor passes, Mr. Werner argued that concessionaires do not
see any revenue from pass sales. As a concession to senior and disabled passholders, Mr. Werner
proposed that concessionaires offer a 10 percent discount to these passholders at standard amenity
recreation fee day use sites. Western Slope No-Fee Coalition, supra note 201, at 29. After a
brief search, the Western Slope No-Fee Coalition found at least ten online comments containing
identical wording to Mr. Werner’s letter, all of which were submitted by individuals affiliated with
concessionaires. Western Slope No-Fee Coalition, supra note 201, at 4.
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facilities such as marinas.216 The new directives run contrary to former Forest
Service directives prohibiting all outdoor advertising except posting of available
services and accommodations.217
In the notice of the new directives published in the Federal Register, the
agency again acknowledged that the majority of the comments weighed against
increased commercialization.218 “Most respondents stated that [the Forest Service]
and other Federal lands should be a refuge from the constant commercialism in
their daily lives and that advertising detracts from the natural environment they
seek when visiting the [national forests].”219 In the notice, the agency responded
to the public comments opposing the directives specifically acknowledging
that general outdoor advertising was inappropriate in the national forests, but
argued that limited advertising pursuant to the new directives provided “a useful
public service that would not otherwise be available.”220 More fundamentally,
the agency stated that it “sees a public need to promote public interest and
participation in management of [Forest Service] lands.”221 The Forest Service
stated this need could be met by increased advertising pursuant to the directives
and “sponsorship of events, projects, and programs that provide for evaluation
of solutions to specific natural resource management problems, increase
conservation awareness, or promote public safety.”222 The agency did not expand
upon this statement, but it went on to provide a glimpse into its priorities by
stating that “[w]ithout sponsorship opportunities, these endeavors might not
provide a return on investment for concessioners and therefore most likely would
not be undertaken.”223 The text left unclear exactly what kind of endeavors are
contemplated as appropriate. In any event, these new directives show that despite
overwhelming public opinion against such action, the agency is moving towards
increased entanglement with concessionaires.
The debate over concessions and the direction the Forest Service takes
moving forward hints at the broader issue: what is and what should be the
role of private enterprise on public lands? Professor Joseph Sax argues that the
debate is one over whether questions of recreation demand should be met from
either an entrepreneurial perspective or from a public policy perspective.224 This
entrepreneurial perspective centers on the idea that privatization—the process by
216
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which certain public services and functions are transferred from the government
to private-sector providers—is a tool capable of controlling costs and improving
performance.225 Proponents of privatization argue that shifting government
services to the private sector allows businesses to harness market competition,
thereby providing better service at lower costs.226
Specifically, proponents of privatization see federal ownership of public lands
as wasteful.227 They argue that the federal government losing billions in the course
of managing federal land assets is unacceptable.228 Furthermore, they argue that
government management has actually been deleterious to the ecological health
of public lands.229 Proponents point to the General Service Administration’s
competitive contracting system as justifying the increased presence of private
entities on the public lands.230 After adopting a competitive contracting program
in the 1980s providing maintenance services to various agencies, those agencies
realized savings of between forty and fifty percent over the cost of custodial
work with their own staff.231 Contracting, could therefore lead to similar land
management agency savings. Indeed, through contracting out routine services,
the Forest Service has found more time, money, and staff to devote to duties
higher on the agency’s priority list.232 Those in favor of increasing concessionaire
presence further argue that because contracting saves the agency money, the
agency can do more with ever-decreasing budget allocations.233 Whether the
concession system is actually saving money, and whether concessions are the most
efficient way to use the agency’s money in the first place is at best unclear. Data
that would answer this question are difficult to come by, and the government
has not conducted a programmatic study comparing agency management with
concession management.

225
Ronald D. Utt, Transferring Functions to the Private Sector, in Heritage Foundation,
Mandate For Leadership IV: Turning Ideas Into Actions (Stuart M. Butler & Kim R. Holmes,
eds., Heritage Found. ed. 1997).
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See Western Slope No-Fee Coalition, supra note 201, at 5.

See Terry L. Anderson et al., How and Why to Privatize Federal Lands, 363 Policy Analysis
1, 2 (1999), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa363.pdf.
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Disregarding the question of efficiency, concessionaires are a significant and
growing presence on federal lands. It is reasonable to assume that when given the
opportunity to increase its presence on these lands, a concessionaire with at least
some profit motive will usually choose the path leading to increased revenue.
However, the mere existence of a profit motive does not necessarily mean the
management philosophy of concessionaires excludes the health of the land and
the mission of the Forest Service. In managing land, what is best for the land
and for the public often intersect. A concessionaire might not advocate recklessly
building additional facilities on land if it is clear those additional facilities will
take away from the intrinsic attraction and value of the land. This course of action
could reduce the number of recreational visitors to that land and ultimately lower
the concessionaire’s bottom line.
It is not necessarily true that additional facilities take away from the
attractiveness and intrinsic value of a recreation site though. Recreation is big
business. Spending by recreation visitors in areas surrounding national forests
amounts to nearly $13 billion per year.234 Given that this correlates with the
increase in concession operations, there does not appear to be much motive to
reduce the scale of concession management. The Forest Service estimates that “a
small campground concession with one to three developed recreation sites might
produce revenue ranging from $50,000 to $105,000, while a large campground
concession with ten to twelve developed recreation sites might generate revenue
in excess of $1,000,000.”235
In addition to revenue generation, other on-the-ground justifications exist
for private entities to manage public land. An independent entity in charge of
managing an area, due to that entity’s independence from bureaucratic hurdles
typically involved in government decisiomaking, can likely respond more quickly
to increases in recreation demand or changing conditions on the ground. Private
entities can respond to changing conditions whether or not a portion of fees
remain on site, presuming the concessionaire has available capital. Thus, a private
land manager removed from the land management agency likely provides a more
direct pathway between on-the-ground problems and potential solutions.
As opposed to advocacy for private entities to manage federal land, Professor
Joseph Sax refers to what he calls the public policy perspective, arguing that
privatization is not the best path forward for public lands when considering all
economic and noneconomic factors.236 Indeed, in internal material discussing the
agency’s budget priorities and justifying its allocation of resources, the agency
does not discuss recreation, let alone any intangible, noneconomic benefit to the
234
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public.237 In its 2012 fiscal year overview, the agency stated that it “works to
efficiently maximize limited resources and create a high return on investment for
the American taxpayer.”238 The agency makes this statement in a section headed
“Forest Service Value,” situated in a passage justifying government expenditures
for national forests.239 The agency justifies its actions based on restoring and
improving forest health, conducting research, and providing financial and
technical assistance to its partners.240 These justifications make no mention of
recreation or benefit to the public. This language places the agency in the same
arena as proponents of privatization, justifying continued funding for national
forests through monetary and tangible gain rather than focusing on the public as
per the agency’s mission statement.
Sax stated that questions of privatization come down to a debate between
an entrepreneurial and a public policy perspective.241 The demand for recreation
creates a multi- billion-dollar industry.242 The existence of this demand by
itself, however, does not necessarily demonstrate that agency policy should be
committed to fulfilling that demand to the exclusion of all other factors.243 From a
public policy perspective, owners of the public lands and citizens have a collective
desire different from the sum of market demands.244 One may decide to forego
the greatest dollar return on property in favor of an alternative use believed to
provide a greater non-monetary return.245 The national forests are examples of
this; the agency could likely produce the greatest monetary return on the lands
it manages through extensive mineral leasing and timber sales, but its land
management decisions are made pursuant to a stated agency mission that does not
include profit.246
Decision-making driven by this mission furthers the idea that the Forest
Service is iconic in American culture. The Forest Service manages and stewards
some of the most beautiful and valuable land and water in the United States.
Americans familiar with national forests know the agency’s shield and sign design
as well as they know Smokey the Bear. Moreover, Americans find intrinsic value in
seeing and interacting with Forest Service personnel.247 The public is more likely
237

See, e.g., U.S.D.A. Forest Service, supra note 63, at 12.

238

Id. at 2.

239

See id.

240

Id.

241

See Sax, supra note 224, at 70.

242

See supra note 56 and accompanying text.

243

See supra note 56 and accompanying text.

244

Supra note 56 and accompanying text.

245

See supra note 56 and accompanying text.

246

See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.

247

See Western Slope No-Fee Coalition, supra note 201, at 5.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol14/iss2/6

30

Kirschner: Can't See the Forest for the Fees: An Examination of Recreation F

2014

Can’t See the Forest for the Fees

543

to trust and rely on personnel employed through the Forest Service because, at
least in theory, these employees are trained to subscribe to the agency’s mission
and goals.248 A concessionaire, on the other hand, is an entity dedicated to its
own preservation and to revenue generation. Employees of a concessionaire have
presumably made the decision to work for that entity using a different calculus
than those who decide to work for the agency. This serves to highlight the
differing experience of recreation users at concession sites and sheds light on some
of the less-tangible losses that come from increased concession management.
Essentially, privatization threatens the agency’s status in the eyes of the public. It
has the potential to shift the agency from an iconic steward of the public lands to
a franchisor of recreation opportunities for private entities.
The Forest Service’s motivation and mission raise an additional concern
stemming from the increased presence of profit-motivated third parties in
national forests. The Forest Service has multiple mission statements; throughout
its history, the agency has been guided by the Organic Act, MUSY, and NFMA.249
The agency should operate pursuant to those mission statements. Concessionaires,
on the other hand, have no such mission statements, or if they do, those missions
are driven by strikingly different objectives.
The Forest Service recognizes this concern.250 The Forest Service Manual states
that the agency should “[a]uthorize concession developments only where there is
a demonstrated public need. . . [and] not permit concession development either
solely for the purpose of establishing a profit-making commercial enterprise or
where satisfactory public service is or could be provided on nearby private or other
public lands.”251 Considering the amount of and rise in concessionaire-managed
lands, it is difficult to believe the agency keeps these requirements in mind when
choosing how to manage recreation opportunities.252 It is unlikely there is a
demonstrated public need for profit-motivated third parties to manage each of
the more than 2,000 agency campgrounds currently run by concessionaires.253
In making decisions on the best way to manage these thousands of
campgrounds, the Forest Service should be neither a franchisor nor a chain of
private campgrounds. When a profit-motivated third party is allowed to sign
a concession agreement and operate on the public lands, the risk of diluting
something essential about the national forests and the public lands as a whole
arises. Public lands have always been the nation’s playground. The government
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owns and stewards the public lands for the people. The FLREA does not allow the
national forests to charge an entrance fee. The public lands are not amusement
parks or roadside attractions. Public lands belong to the public.
National forests serve many purposes, none of which are accomplished when
the agency finds methods to skirt fee requirements.254 Certainly creating a class
of profit-motivated land managers unanswerable to fee requirements and passes
intended to give something back to the elderly and the disabled serves no grand
purpose. This loss of an essential quality—the diminution of the “public” aspect
of the public lands—cannot be represented on a balance sheet. This “public”
aspect is no less vital, however, than any line item on an agency budget. The
Forest Service is the steward of America’s national forests, land in turn valuable,
beautiful, and wild. The agency provides the public access to these lands—their
lands. The concession system puts up barriers to that access. It interposes profitmotivated third parties between the public and the land, and by doing so strains
that essential connection.

IX. The FLREA Post-2015
The FLREA is scheduled to sunset on December 8, 2015.255 Setting aside
for the moment the difficulties inherent in passing any bill through the current
Congress, the federal land management agencies have an opportunity to reconsider
the law and modify its more controversial provisions.256 This can be accomplished
through a process of evaluation and revision of the law itself by reassessing the
priorities involved in establishing and assessing recreation fees.
To this end in 1996, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) published
the results of an audit determining the rate of return to the federal government
from concession operations.257 Of the six land management agencies—the Army
Corps of Engineers, National Park Service, Bureaus of Reclamation, Bureau of
Land Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, and Forest Service—the National
Park Service and Forest Service concessions operations accounted for about ninety
percent of gross revenues and fees paid to the government.258 The GAO noted that

254

See supra notes 109–76 and accompanying text.
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Forest Service officials insisted that the primary purpose of concession programs
was providing a service to the public, not maximizing the rate of return.259 But
the audit did not ask the more fundamental question of what would happen if
concessionaire operations were replaced by agency operations.260
As such, a more comprehensive audit and study of the Forest Service
concession structure must be conducted. The Forest Service Manual states that
concession development is authorized only where there is a demonstrated public
need.261 This mandate is likely not being followed given the extreme increase
in concession development and management. The agency would likely have
a difficult time justifying the rapid increase in concession development with a
corresponding public need that could not be satisfied by agency management of
recreation sites. Moreover, whether the current concession structure is financially
justifiable, especially in light of the philosophical and foundational concerns raised
by concessions on public lands, remains unclear. In his 1997 letter to regional
foresters, then-agency Chief Dombeck stated that concessionaire management
is key to providing quality services in light of declining work forces and capital
resources.262 Whether this is true is impossible to determine without an extensive
survey of the concession program as advocated in this section.
Even if an audit determines that instead of contracting land management
to concessionaires the agency should operate all these recreation sites on its
own, the question remains whether agency operation of sites is feasible. This
presents perhaps the biggest stumbling block for the agency in transitioning away
from concession management. Concessionaires have achieved a symbiotic—
perhaps even parasitic—relationship with the Forest Service. The agency
considers concessionaires partners and refers to the recreation-seeking public as
“customers.”263 Concessionaires are even given free rein to ignore a law designed
to restore public trust in a stable recreation fee system and to ensure the public is
actually getting benefits for their recreation fees.264 These are powerful indicators
that the concession structure is here to stay, no matter the result of an audit, as the
agency appears to have no desire to consider an alternative path.
Should the agency decide that recreation management on the national
forests is to change, what should that change look like? If the goal is minimizing
intrusion of profit-motivated third parties into public lands, then it must be
259

Id. at 16.

260

Id. at 16.

Forest Service, Forest Service Manual, FSM 2300—Recreation, Wilderness, and
Related Resource Management, Chapter 2343.03—Concession Uses Involving Privately
Developed Facilities (2006).
261

262

See Letter from Mike Dombeck, supra note 197.

263

See supra notes 195–96 and accompanying text.

264

See supra notes 175–76 and accompanying text.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2014

33

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 14 [2014], No. 2, Art. 6

546

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 14

accomplished through two steps. First, the agency must reexamine the nature and
value of its relationship with concessionaires. As noted above, this relationship
raises fundamental questions about the nature and mission of the agency and how
allowing private entities to manage public lands fits into that mission.265 Second,
the FLREA must be redrafted to level the playing field in the national forests,
reestablish public trust in the agency’s decisionmaking on fee issues, and shed
light on the structure of and justification for fees.
To reform the recreation structure in national forests, the Forest Service’s first
step should be adopting a recreation management strategy that has proven useful
in many other sectors: partnerships with dedicated nonprofit organizations.266 The
agency cites declining revenues and resources as justifications for its relationship
with concessionaires.267 In light of this, the Forest Service has increasingly turned to
profit-motivated third parties. However, it is unclear whether third parties are any
more efficient than nonprofit organizations. Economist William Baumol noted
that where there is some special basis for reliance on idealism, social pressure, or
special enthusiasm, nonprofits may find a unique place in which to operate with
noteworthy efficiency.268 It would seem, especially in light of the foundational
issues discussed above, providing recreation services on public lands falls into
each of these categories.269 Baumol recommends agencies foster relationships with
local, grassroots nonprofits whose goal is improving local conditions and local
recreation opportunities.270 This seems a logical step; already, hundreds if not
thousands of local nonprofits exist to preserve and protect local recreational and
natural areas.271
Furthermore, nonprofits have already demonstrated success in taking over
and managing recreation areas in similar contexts.272 One such example is Hueco
265
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Tanks State Park and Historic Site, located in an area outside of El Paso, Texas.273
For many years, climbers visiting the park stayed at the Hueco Rock Ranch, a
private lodging facility with access to the site.274 In 2011, the landowner was
looking to sell the property to a climber-friendly buyer who could manage the
property onsite.275 The owner reached out to the Access Fund, an organization
dedicated to protecting and preserving land for climbing, to assist locating just
such a buyer.276 With the help of the Access Fund, the owner connected with
the American Alpine Club (AAC), a § 501(c)(3) charitable organization whose
mission is providing knowledge and inspiration, conservation and advocacy, and
logistical support for the climbing community.277 Using short-term funding from
the Access Fund’s Land Conservation Campaign, the Access Fund purchased
Hueco Rock Ranch, assigning it to the AAC.278 The AAC immediately began
undertaking improvements to the property’s structures and tent camping facility
and hired an onsite manager for the property.279
In similar purchases, the Access Fund also used its land trust to purchase the
Hospital Boulders climbing area near Gadsden, Alabama.280 The climbing area
will ultimately be owned and managed by the Southeastern Climbers Coalition
(SCC).281 SCC is a local nonprofit dedicated to preserving climbing areas in
the southeast, owning and managing many climbing areas in the Southeastern
United States.282
To be sure, a nonprofit partnership model has its own inherent challenges.
The agency would have to determine which nonprofits properly align with the
agency’s mission and whether the nonprofit is logistically and administratively
capable of managing the land. A robust screening process should alleviate or
eliminate most of these concerns.

American Alpine Club, supra note 272. Hueco Tanks contains some of the most beautiful
and challenging rock climbing in the United States.
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Access Fund, supra note 272. As of November 25, 2013, the Southeastern Climbers
Coalition has already raised more than half of the money needed to pay back the Access Fund land
trust for its purchase of the land. Press Release, Southeastern Climbers Coalition, Hospital Boulders
Thermometer Rising (Nov. 25, 2013), available at http://www.seclimbers.org/modules.php?name=
News&file=article&sid=612.
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A nonprofit partnership model can work to effectively manage recreation
areas. However, whether this model can operate as efficiently as the concession
model, and whether this model more closely preserves the unique nature of
the public lands is still to be determined. Local nonprofits—though they
have overhead and costs just like profit-motivated entities—have additional
considerations concessionaires do not have. These nonprofits are mission agencies
dedicated to protecting and preserving unique and valuable aspects of public
lands, including recreation opportunities.283 This management model does not
eliminate concern over the public interacting with non-agency personnel, but
public trust in the employees of a dedicated mission-oriented nonprofit would
nonetheless be significant as compared to trust in employees of for-profit entities.
Recreation users arriving at campgrounds and trailheads would encounter
personnel employed by an agency with a mission more closely aligned with that
of the Forest Service. Signage could inform users that the area is managed by
a nonprofit dedicated to protecting and preserving the area, not a third party
organized and operated primarily to generate revenue.
With a nonprofit partnership, the agency could oversee general operations
and review revenue allocations. Profits in excess of that necessary to maintain
operations could be remitted to the Treasury or kept on site and put towards
minimizing environmental impacts, improving facilities, or hiring additional
personnel. A revenue structure allowing nonprofit managers to hold profits for
use on site would permit managers to respond to time sensitive land conditions
and increased recreation demand as quickly as concessionaires. Keeping the profits
on site allows nonprofits to close the resource gap with private, profit-motivated
third parties.
Despite its seeming advantages, this management model would not exclude
profit-motivated third parties from managing land in national forests. Believing
suitable nonprofits could manage every recreation area currently operated by
concessionaires is unrealistic. The agency must match recreation areas and
nonprofit land managers by scope and capability. For instance, a small nonprofit
would likely find itself overwhelmed trying to manage a large recreation area with
dozens of campsites, cabins, and other infrastructure. However, that same nonprofit
might be perfect to maintain and manage a fee trailhead with fewer amenities. The
nonprofit management model offers an alternative to concessionaire management
conforming to and complementing the unique nature of public lands.

283
Nonprofits involved in efforts to protect and secure recreation interests on the public
lands include the Access Fund, see supra notes 277–83 and accompanying text; the Backcountry
Hunters and Anglers, see Backcountry Hunters and Anglers, http://www.backcountryhunters.
org/ (last visited Apr. 30, 2014); and the Outdoor Alliance, see The Outdoor Alliance, http://
www.outdooralliance.net/ (last visited Apr. 30, 2014).
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In addition to nonprofit management, volunteer management should be
considered. Many national forest campgrounds and trailheads do not require
extensive infrastructure management.284 Many recreational facilities use guest and
volunteer hosts and personnel residing on the premises.285 Volunteer management
provides not only unique and valuable opportunities for volunteers themselves,
but also significant financial advantages to the agency. Consider that in 2008,
Forest Service volunteers contributed 3.4 million hours to the agency, valued at
more than $59 million.286 To an agency looking to concessionaires to help alleviate
declining revenues, this shows vast potential as a source of labor and management
outside of typical financial considerations.
The existing volunteer infrastructure is not without its problems. Like
many recordkeeping and administrative functions within the Forest Service, the
volunteer infrastructure is severely fragmented over different regions, districts,
and forests.287 Existing infrastructure is inefficient; a 2007 study indicated that
Forest Service staff with responsibility for volunteers allocated only fifteen percent
of job time to volunteer administration and training.288 Additionally, volunteer
programs are not free. A 2003 study indicates that costs associated with training,
administration, supervision, management, and recognition of volunteers ranges
from $350–$1,250 per volunteer annually, with a return on investment of $2.05
to $21.24 for every $1.57 invested.289
Even considering the costs, however, a nonprofit-volunteer management
structure could be an ideal solution to balance economic and foundational
concerns regarding management of public lands. As discussed above, if profits
were kept on site, a nonprofit could manage land as effectively as any private
entity.290 Furthermore, volunteers and nonprofits are far more likely to subscribe
to the agency’s mission and goals than a private entity as volunteers and nonprofits
generally remove profit motive from their decision-making process.

284

See Forest Service Manual, supra note 71.

See, e.g., Forest Service, Become a Campground Host, (2011), available at http://
www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/stelprdb5319610.pdf; USDA Forest Service,
Volunteers in the National Forests (2014), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/fsjobs/forestservice/
volunteers.html.
285

Forest Service, Forest Service Volunteer Program Management—Capacity Assessment 2
(Mar. 2009).
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Id.
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Id. at 3.
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Id.
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See supra notes 263 –77 and accompanying text.
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The next step in reforming recreation management is removing the
concessionaire exemption—the poison pill—from the FLREA.291 The FLREA’s
goals were to create a stable recreation fee structure and to restore public trust in
land management agencies administering recreation fees.292 The concessionaire
exemption runs counter to each of these goals. It is no longer certain where and
for what the public will be charged a fee in the national forests. For reasons such
as this, public trust in land management agencies administering recreation fees
seems to be at an all time low, and creating an exit ramp for concessionaires has
not helped. Indeed, the public can reasonably view the current structure together
with the rise of concessionaires as a direct assault on the fundamental nature of the
public lands. Removing the concessionaire exemption creates stability by giving
the FLREA uniform application in recreation areas and bringing the practical
affects of the law in line with its stated goals and purpose.

X. Conclusion
The Forest Service is an agency with a rich history and a series of mission
statements highlighting the agency’s benefit to the public. Throughout its history,
the agency has adapted to a changing national landscape, in part by rising to meet
an increasing demand for recreation on national forests.293 As a way to meet that
demand, the agency formed partnerships with private entities. These partnerships
have grown to the point that recreation visitors to campgrounds and trailheads in
national forests are far more likely to encounter employees of a private third-party
concessionaire than any agency personnel.294
Increased entanglement with profit-motivated third parties endangers the
unique relationship between the public and the Forest Service as a steward of
the public lands.295 Public lands belong to the public. When a private entity is
interjected into this relationship, it severs the connection between the people and
the agency in its role as steward of the public lands. Furthermore, the increased
presence of concessionaires in national forests undermines the system of recreation
and access fees established by the FLREA.296 Permitting concessionaires to charge
fees with such discretion renders useless the pass system established by the FLREA.
This, too, endangers the relationship between the public and the agency, eroding
public trust in the agency to manage the land and activities on the land in a
transparent manner in keeping with the agency’s mission.

291

See supra notes 175–76 and accompanying text.

292

See H.R. Rep. No. 108-790(I), supra note 102, at *18.

293

See supra notes 11–67 and accompanying text.

294

See supra notes 60 – 65 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 212–25 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 187–89 and accompanying text.
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Moving forward, the agency must eliminate the poison pill—concessionaires
must be subject to the same amenity requirements as the agency if they are to
charge fees.297 Charging fees merely for entrance into national forests is contrary
to the FLREA’s requirements, and allowing concessionaires to charge fees simply
because they are a third party undermines public trust, feeding the perception of
the agency as increasingly revenue motivated. Ultimately, transitioning to a system
in which mission-oriented nonprofits manage land in place of concessionaires
is vital for the Forest Service to maintain its integrity as steward of the public
lands. This system has been successful in the private sector and could easily be
adapted to work in the national forests.298 Whatever the solution, permitting
profit-motivated third parties to control and regulate access to the public lands
is untenable. As lawmakers consider reauthorization of the FLREA, they have
the opportunity to right the ship and strengthen the fundamental relationship
between the public and the Forest Service.
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See supra notes 187–89 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 279–90 and accompanying text.
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